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How

SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT FAILED
DISPLACED NEW ORLEANS VOTERS
REA L. HOLMES*

Hurricane Katrina served as a wake-up call to America. In full
color, the country saw firsthand how race and socioeconomics affect
every aspect of one's life. The heart-wrenching images of thousands
of tired, scared, and helpless people will forever be etched in America's history. Even more devastating is the continued struggle the citizens of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast face almost a year after the
storm.
Life, as it usually does, has slowly begun to move forward in New
Orleans. Rebuilding strategies are being crafted and debated by
many.' One recent strategy discussed was how best to hold elections
in a city that does not have the infrastructure to support many of its
own current and returning residents. In the wake of Hurricane
Katrina, state officials were forced to postpone the February 4, 2006,
primary and March 4, 2006, general elections. Between December
2005 and April 2006, state officials were under pressure to devise an
election plan that would not only be accepted by the public, but also
be precleared by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in accordance with
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). a While the elections took
place in April and May of this year, the effectiveness of the election
plan continues to be debated.

*

Associate at LaFollette Godfrey & Kahn, Madison, Wisconsin; J.D., Univer-

sity of California, Los Angeles, School of Law, 2005 (concentration in the Critical
Race Studies Program). For endless edits and good advice, I would like to thank
Laureen and Dorothy. I would also like to thank Professor Cheryl Harris and Saul
Sarabia for all of their support.
1. See Stephanie Grace, Editorial, Candidates Duck Rebuilding Decisions,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 18, 2006, Metro, at 5.

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
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This essay examines the obstacles Louisiana state officials faced
in preparing an election plan. First, this essay explores the racial and
political makeup of the state and New Orleans pre-Katrina. Next, the
essay delves into the factors that led to postponing the elections and
the controversy surrounding that decision. The essay then turns to the
election plan for New Orleans, including the initial proposed plan and
the DOJ's role in approving the New Orleans election plan. This section outlines the factors used by the DOJ and whether it was justified
in preclearing the plan. Next, the essay addresses the actual voting
procedures in place for both the primary and general elections, as well
as the opposition to the plan. As is discussed, the state had to amend
existing election law in order to allow greater access to the ballot beyond 2006. The final section articulates proposals for future New Orleans elections. These future elections will provide a chance for both
state and federal officials to apply the lessons learned from the previous post-Katrina elections to ensure that voting procedures are in
place to ease the burden on displaced voters.
I. LOUISIANA BEFORE THE STORM

Many label Louisiana, and New Orleans in particular, a melting
pot of diverse cultures. 3 Before Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana was
32.3% African-American, but only 2.4% Hispanic, 1.2% Asian, and
0.5% Native-American. 4 In contrast, New Orleans was a majorityminority city with its population being almost 70% African-American,
3.8% Hispanic, and 2.7% Asian. Instead of a melting pot, however,
much of New Orleans remained segregated by class and race. For example, in addition to being 63.7% African-American, 6 Orleans Parish,
which encompasses most of New Orleans, was also "one of the poorest areas in the nation." 7 When New Orleans' levee system failed and
3. See, e.g., Tomas Alex Tizon & Doug Smith, Evacuees of HurricaneKatrina
Resettle Along a Racial Divide, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2005, Main News, at 1 (quot-

ing Laura Ann Sanchez, a family and demographics researcher, referring to New Orleans' "truly astonishing melting pot of race and culture").
4.

MICHAEL BARONE & RICHARD E. COHEN, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN

POLITICS 2006, at 727 (2005).

5. Id.at 739.
6. Id.
7.

Tizon & Smith, supra note 3.
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sent water careening into areas such as the Ninth Ward,8 poor African
Americans were most affected by the devastating storm.
Less known was that the hurricane also greatly affected the political and racial make-up of New Orleans' voter districts and possibly
the state legislature. Since the passage of the VRA in 1965, African
Americans have garnered increasing political power in New Orleans
and Louisiana. As of October 2005, 51% of Orleans Parish's registered voters were African-American Democrats. 9 Moreover, "[fjour
of the nine African-Americans in the State Senate hail from New Orleans-as do a third of the African-American representatives in the
State House." 10
Much of African Americans' political success can be attributed to
the VRA. "In 1964, before the passage of the Voting Rights Act, less
than a third of Louisiana's voting-age blacks were registered to
vote ....

"11Conversely, pre-Katrina, "[b]lack registration ... [was]
'
disproportionately high in relation to the eligible black population. "12

Moreover, in each U.S. Senate primary or runoff election since 1996
where Louisiana's African-American electorate cast a majority of its
votes for a candidate, that candidate won.13 Thus, before the storm, it
appeared that "[t]he initial goals of4 the Voting Rights Act [had] long
since been achieved in Louisiana."'
Despite the initial success of the VRA in Louisiana, voter disenfranchisement remains a distinct possibility as state and local officials
continue to debate how best to hold future elections. Reports vary on
the long range effects Katrina will have on New Orleans' population.
A recent study found that three years after Katrina, New Orleans'
8. See id.
9. See Fred Brown, DisruptedElections in La., DENV. POST, Oct. 2, 2005, at
E06 (stating that of Orleans Parish's 299,298 voters, 154,000 are black Democrats).
10. Kristen Clarke-Avery & M. David Gelfand, Voting Rights Challenges in a
Post-Katrina World: With ConstituentsDispersed,and Voting Districts Underpopulated, How Should New Orleans Hold Elections?, FINDLAW LEGAL COMMENT., Oct.
11, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/2005101 1_gelfand.html.
11. Edward Blum & Abigail Themstrom, Executive Summary of the BullockGaddie Expert Report on Louisiana, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y RES.,
Feb. 10, 2006, http://www.aei.org/include/pub_print.asp?publD=23861.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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population will only reach 272,000 or "about 56 percent of the preKatrina population."' 15 Moreover, low-lying areas, such as the Ninth
Ward, are expected to repopulate at slower rates than the rest of the
city.

16

These projections highlight the real possibility that New Orleans
and Louisiana will lose the achievements brought about by the VRA
because of the lack of returning African Americans. As noted above,
New Orleans was, and may still be, a center of African-American political participation. Future New Orleans elections, therefore, will
greatly determine African-American representation in Louisiana.
II. POSTPONED ELECTIONS
Before Katrina, the scheduled February 4, 2006, election was
viewed as relatively mild. Mayor Ray Nagin was predicted to "walk
into a second term with only token opposition."' 7 Besides the mayor,
a wide range of other positions were to be on the February ballot, in8
cluding City Council seats, assessors, and the criminal sheriff.'
However, in late 2005, due to the difficulties of conducting an election, Louisiana Secretary of State Al Ater advised Governor Kathleen
Blanco to postpone the election indefinitely, citing "[tihe unavailability of polling places, difficulties in locating and training poll commissioners and workers for absentee balloting, and the huge task of recer9
tifying and replacing damaged voting machines."'
The difficulty of holding a fair election was compounded by Louisiana's election system. All congressional, state, and local candidates, regardless of party affiliation, run in an open primary.2 ° If a
15. KEVIN MCCARTHY ET AL., THE REPOPULATION OF NEW ORLEANS AFTER
HURRICANE
KATRINA,
at
xiii
(2006),
available
at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technicalreports/2006/RANDTR369.pdf.
16. Id.
17. Gordon Russell, Katrina Rewrites N.O. Politics: Mayor's Race Reduced to
a Question Mark, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 23, 2005, National, at 1.
18. Frank Donze & Ed Anderson, February Elections PlannedAmid Immense
Challenges: 204 of 442 N.O. Precincts Are Out of Commission, TIMES-PICAYUNE

(New Orleans), Oct. 11, 2005, Metro, at 1.
19. Katrina Blows Municipal Elections Further into Next Year, CNN, Dec. 2,

2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/12/02/elections.postponedl/index.html?section
=cnn topstories.
20. BARONE & COHEN, supranote 4, at 726.
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candidate receives 50% or more of the vote, she automatically wins
the election.21 If no one receives 50%, the candidates with the two
highest vote totals compete in a runoff election one month after the
primary. 22 This system presented unique challenges for New Orleans
because it required the battered city to conduct two elections within
thirty days of each other.
Upon the recommendation of Secretary Ater, Governor Blanco issued Executive Order KBB 2005-96 on December 9, 2005, postponing both the primary and general elections scheduled for early 2006.23
The postponement drew widespread criticism from those who thought
an election would signal to the world that New Orleans was moving in
the right direction. 24 An election would be seen as a symbol of
American democracy at work and a sign of progress in New Orleans.
Even in America's darkest days of the Civil War, President Lincoln
steadfastly refused to call off the 1864 election: "[T]he election was a
necessity. We cannot have free government without elections. 25
Opponents of postponement echoed Lincoln's sentiments. An
editorial by New Orleans' Times-Picayune newspaper equated a delay
to "conceding defeat., 26 The editorial further noted that delaying the
elections until late 2006 "would send the message that New Orleans
couldn't manage something as basic as an election in its first year after
Hurricane Katrina. It would also keep officials in office more than six
months after their terms should have expired., 27 The possibility of
city officials maintaining their positions angered many residents who

21. Id.
22. Id.

23. La. Exec. Order KBB 2005-96 (Dec. 9, 2005), available at
http://www.gov.state.la.us/assets/docs/PDFs/EO%2096.pdf.
On September 14,
2005, Governor Blanco postponed a Jefferson Parish special primary election
scheduled for October 15, 2005, and the special general elections scheduled for November 12, 2005. La. Exec. Order KBB 2005-36 (Sept. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.gov.state.la.us/assets/docs/36DelayVoting- 10-1 5-05& 11-12-05.pdf.
24. See, e.g., Editorial, They Did It in Baghdad, TIMES-PICAYuNE (New Orleans), Dec. 8, 2005, Metro, at 6.
25. Commentary, Election Terrors, PROGRESSIVE, Sept. 1, 2004, at 8 (quoting
President Abraham Lincoln).
26. Editorial, supranote 24.
27. Id.
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felt the mayor and other city officials were directly responsible for the
lack of preparation and inadequate response to Hurricane Katrina.28
In the end, the fervor over proving New Orleans was on the fast
track to recovery hurt displaced voters. Contrary to the TimesPicayune's contention, holding elections is far from "basic." From
voter education, to ordering ballots, to voter registration, the election
process is a complex undertaking. If the 2000 presidential election
taught Americans anything, it was that every detail surrounding an
election has far-reaching implications. While New Orleans may have
desired to paint a rosy picture, the truth is that the hurricane destroyed
voting machines and polling sites and, more importantly, scattered the
electorate.29 By February 2006, there remained concerns over
whether officials could even provide safe polling places in parts of Orleans Parish. As critics noted, "the integrity of the election [was]
threatened by serious problems within the city itself, where some polling stations [were] dilapidated and possibly hazardous, and others
30
[were] inaccessible to the disabled-a violation of federal law."
While there were real and legitimate concerns over elected officials remaining in office, postponing the election until September
would have allowed officials the time needed to ensure fair voting
procedures were in place. In the end, however, political pressure prevailed, and the primary election was rescheduled for Saturday, April
22, 2006, and the general elections for Saturday, May 20, 2006.31
III. PLANNING FOR THE ELECTION

A. An Initial Election Plan
Immediately after the storm, Louisiana Secretary of State Al Ater
began to devise an election plan. In November 2005, Secretary Ater
initially proposed a sweeping election plan to the Louisiana Legisla-

28. See, e.g., Musa Eubanks & Veda Manue, Letter to the Editor, The Right to
Oust Our Leaders, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 11, 2005, Metro, at 18.
29. Bruce Eggler, Blanco Postpones N.O. Elections: Group Sues to Keep Primary on Feb. 4, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 13, 2005, Metro, at 1.
30. Tracy Clark-Flory, Whitewashing the New Orleans Vote?, SALON, Apr. 15,
2006, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/04/15/neworleans-vote/print.html.
31. See id.
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ture. 32 Secretary Ater suggested a combination of absentee balloting
and expanded polling locations in order to reach every voter. 33 He
34
stated, "If there are five voters in Boise, Idaho, I want to find them."
First, to accommodate highly concentrated voters outside of New Orleans, Secretary Ater proposed satellite voting locations in places such
as Baton Rouge, Houston, and Atlanta.35 Second, for those who could
not vote in person, an expanded absentee ballot campaign was planned
in which the Louisiana law requiring first-time voters to vote in person would have been waived. 36 Third, he requested $2.5 million in
federal aid to inspect and replace voting machines damaged during the
storm. 37 Fourth, Ater recommended a massive nationwide outreach
program. 38 He was also in negotiations with the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) for it to provide another $1 million to
conduct a mass-mailing to inform displaced voters of upcoming elec39
tion procedures.
Unfortunately for the displaced voters, Secretary Ater's initial
plan was not adopted by the state legislature. As will be discussed,
the legislature instead chose to allow only in-state satellite locations
and failed to lift all restrictions placed on a first-time voter's ability to
40
cast an absentee ballot.

32. See Donze & Anderson, supra note 18.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Benjamin Greenberg, Voter Disenfranchisementby Attrition: With Friends
Like FEMA, Who Needs Jim Crow?, IN THESE TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005,

http://www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/voter disenfranchisement-by-attritio
n/. Mr. Greenberg suggested that under the Stafford Act, FEMA should be the one
to provide the state with election funds. The Act "gives FEMA [a] role in coordinating relief efforts, provides that FEMA may make contributions towards the repair of

damaged public facilities and provide 'technical and advisory assistance' for 'the
performance of essential community services."' Id.
39. Donze & Anderson, supranote 18.
40. See infra Part IV.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2006

7

California Western Law Review, Vol. 43 [2006], No. 1, Art. 5

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

B. Approval Neededfor an Election Plan
Due to Louisiana's history of minority voter disenfranchisement,
it is considered a "covered jurisdiction,",4 1 and section 5 of the VRA
therefore requires that any changes in the state's voting procedures,
practices, or qualifications must be approved or "precleared" by either
the DOJ or a three judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 The burden is on the jurisdiction to prove the voting changes lacked a discriminatory purpose or effect towards racial
or language minorities. 43 Louisiana, therefore, had to seek DOJ approval before any post-Katrina election plan could be implemented.
To determine whether an election plan violates section 5, the DOJ
utilizes a nonretrogression standard set forth in Beer v. United
States.44 In Beer, New Orleans sought court approval, via a declaratory judgment, for a plan to redraw the city's districts that had been
rejected by the DOJ. 45 The case focused on the number of minoritymajority districts the city should create.4 6 The district court found that
the plan had a discriminatory effect on minorities because it failed to
create districts that had a majority of voting-age minorities and dismissed the case.4 7 The Supreme Court held that preclearance should
be granted as long as the plan did not place minorities in a worse position than they were before the changes were implemented.4 8

41. 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 app. (2006).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000). President George Bush signed the reauthorization of the VRA on July 27, 2006. Press Release, The White House, President
George W. Bush, President Bush Signs Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and
Amendments
Act
of
2006
(July
27,
2006),
available
at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060727.html.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
44. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140-41 (1976). The Beer nonretrogression test is used for voting changes in practice or procedure, but not for redistricting. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 479-80 (2003) (announcing a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether retrogression occurred in a
redistricting plan).
45. Beer, 425 U.S. at 136.
46. Id.at 135-36.
47. Id. at 136-37.
48. Id. at 141-42.
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The Code of Federal Regulations provides guidance on what factors will be used to determine retrogression. 49 In general, the DOJ
will compare the existing law and proposed plans to determine what,
if any, effect the changes will have on racial and language minorities.5" In comparing the two plans, the DOJ uses four main factors:
(a) The extent to which a reasonable and legitimate justification for
the change exists.
(b) The extent to which the jurisdiction followed objective guidelines and fair and conventional procedures in adopting the change.
(c) The extent to which the jurisdiction afforded members of racial
and language minority groups an opportunity to participate in the
decision to make the change.
(d) The extent to which the jurisdiction took the concerns of members of racial
and language minority groups into account in making
51
the change.
The DOJ analyzes these and other factors based on the conditions
existing when the plan is submitted. In the case of New Orleans, the
DOJ looked at the proposed plan in the context of the limitations created by the hurricane. The DOJ determined whether minorities would
be in a better position under Louisiana's pre-Katrina election law or
the proposed election plan.
As will be discussed below, over significant protest, the DOJ approved the plan on March 16, 2006.52 This approval left many to
wonder whether section 5 remained an effective tool if it could not
even protect the displaced voters of New Orleans.
IV. NEW ORLEANS VOTING PROCEDURES
As noted previously, the election plan in place for the April primary was very different from Secretary Ater's original vision. In the
end, the Louisiana legislature adopted, and the DOJ precleared, a plan
that was more restrictive and provided fewer opportunities for displaced residents to vote. The election plan provided three options for
49.
50.
51.
52.
Mar. 17,

28 C.F.R. § 51.54 (2006).
28 C.F.R. § 51.54(b)(1), (4).
28 C.F.R. § 51.57 (2006).
Peter Whoriskey, Election Planfor New Orleans Approved, WASH. POST,
2006, at A03.
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a voter to cast a ballot. 53 First, a voter could vote in person at a desig-

nated Orleans Parish precinct.54 Second, a voter could participate in
"early voting" which took place in the weeks leading up to each election.55 Depending upon how a person registered, an early voter could
cast his or her ballot either in Orleans Parish or one of the ten satellite
polling places located throughout the state.56 Or third, a voter who
registered between October 5, 2004, and September 24, 2005, could
57
vote by absentee ballot.

A. Satellite PollingSites
In Ater's original plan, satellite polling sites would be located outside of Louisiana in cities that held a significant population of displaced New Orleans voters, including Houston and Atlanta.58 This
methodology would have provided equal access to the ballot for displaced New Orleans residents. However, in the plan implemented,
satellite polling sites were restricted to the state of Louisiana and were
only available to those who had either registered in person or registered by mail before September 24, 2005. 59 The requirement for inperson registration placed a great burden on many potential voters because New Orleans had yet to regain a significant portion of its population. Estimates show that at the time of the election, New Orleans
was 64% smaller than before Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 60 Moreover, most of those who had returned to New Orleans were white and
middle-class. 6' The U.S. Census Bureau found that the New Orleans
metropolitan area black population "fell to 21 percent from 36 per-

53. See ELECTIONS Div., LA. SEC'Y OF STATE, DISPLACED VOTER
INFORMATION (2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter ELECTIONS DIVISION].
54. Id.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Donze & Anderson, supra note 18.
59.

ELECTIONS DIVISION, supra note 53.

60. Rick Lyman, Reports Reveal Hurricanes' Impact on Human Landscape,
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2006, at A16.
61. Clifford J. Levy, New Orleans Elections Near, but Who Will Vote and
How?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2005, at Al.
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cent. 6 2 This racial stratification is due in part to the vast number of
African-American evacuees who were relocated hundreds of miles
from Louisiana. 63 According to reports, while suburban middle-class
whites were more likely to find housing close to New Orleans, "[p]oor
blacks from the city were more likely to land farther away in places
much different from [their] home." 64 In addition, the hardest hit areas
of the city, including the Lower Ninth Ward, still remain uninhabitable.6 5 While a great national diaspora might not have occurred, race
and class determined where evacuees were, and largely remain, located.
Though many New Orleans residents relocated within Louisiana,
including a large segment in Baton Rouge, other states absorbed a significant number of displaced residents. For example, Texas was one
of the first states to provide assistance to New Orleans after the storm.
Due in part to that generosity, "the Hbuston metropolitan area
emerged with more than 130,000 new residents, many of them hurricane evacuees." 66 Establishment of a satellite polling site in Houston
would have allowed a significant number of displaced citizens to vote
with minimal burden. Instead, the election plan forced displaced residents voting for the first time to travel back to Louisiana to cast their
ballots, whether or not it was safe or even possible to relocate back to
their old homes. In order to ease the burden, civil rights organizations
provided bus transportation from Texas and other neighboring states
to Louisiana. 67 Satellite locations in states with significant displaced
New Orleans residents would have provided more evacuees with an
opportunity to exercise their fundamental right to vote.
B. Absentee Ballots
Absentee ballots were touted as an effective and efficient means
for displaced voters to cast their ballots. Existing Louisiana election
62. Lyman, supra note 60.
63. See Tizon & Smith, supra note 3.

64. Id.
65.

See Michelle Krupa, Potable Water Ready to Flow in Lower 9: FinalSliver

of City Awaits State's OK, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 7, 2006, National,

at 1.
66. Lyman, supra note 60.

67. Clark-Flory, supra note 30.
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law, however, did not permit all first-time voters to cast an absentee
ballot. Louisiana's election code only allowed a person to cast an absentee ballot if he or she had voted in person during a previous election. 68 This law allowed the potential disenfranchisement of two different types of displaced New Orleans voters. First, citizens who
registered to vote by mail before Katrina hit but failed to actually vote
in person
at a polling place would not be able to cast an absentee ballot.69 Second, a person who registered to vote after Katrina would
have to vote in New Orleans. 70 This law placed a heavy burden on
both first-time voters and those residents who may have moved to a
different voting precinct in the city. In order to vote, they would be
forced to travel to a state-approved polling place.
In response to concerns, the state legislature lifted some of the absentee ballot provisions for the April and May elections only. Under
the new plan, the ability for a first-time voter to cast a ballot depended
on how and when he or she registered to vote. A person was automatically eligible to vote by absentee ballot if he or she met one of the
following two provisions: (1) registered to vote in person, but never
voted, or (2) previously registered and previously voted.7 '
If a displaced resident of New Orleans registered by mail and had
not previously voted, his or her ability to vote by absentee ballot was
based on when he or she registered. Louisiana adopted, and the DOJ
precleared, a complex four-part test to determine if a person could cast
an absentee ballot.72
Registered by mail after September 24, 2005
All residents who fell into this category had to vote in person and
thus could not vote by absentee ballot. A resident was allowed to either vote on the actual election day or vote during the early voting period but only at a polling location within Orleans Parish.73

68. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18:115(F)(1) (2006).
69. See NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC.,
VOTE (2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter NAACP].
70. ELECTIONS DIVISION, supra note 53.
71. Id.
72. See NAACP, supra note 69.
73. Id.
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Registeredon or before October 5, 2004
A first-time voter in this category was also not allowed to vote by
absentee ballot and instead had to physically cast a ballot either in Orleans Parish on the election
day or at one of the ten satellite polling
74
state.
the
sites across
Registered by mail between October 5, 2004, and September 24,
2005
A displaced voter who fell into this category could vote either in
person, during the early voting period, or by absentee ballot. 75 The

voter, however, had to complete a Displaced Voter Affidavit to accompany the request for an absentee ballot.7 6 The affidavit had to be

either notarized or signed by two witnesses and required the voter to
certify that he or she was displaced due to Hurricanes Katrina or Rita
and that he or she was eligible to vote.77
Student voters
Student voters encountered the fewest obstacles to voting. Firsttime student voters who registered by mail and attended school outside of Orleans Parish could avail themselves of any of the three voting options.78
All requests for absentee ballots had to be submitted by April 18,
2006, for the primary election and May 16, 2006, for the general election. 79 New Orleans' election plan, however, was not precleared by
the DOJ until March 16, 2006.80 While state officials had sent out
voter information mailers before the plan received preclearance, 8 1 the
uncertainty of the situation undoubtedly confused many voters.

74. Id.

75. Id.
76. ELECTIONS

DIVISION,

supra note 53.

77. Id.

78. Id.
79. NAACP, supranote 69.
80. Whoriskey, supra note 52.
81. See Letter from Cleo Fields, Senator, State of La., to John K. Tanner, Civil
Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Mar. 7, 2006), at 5, available at
http://senate.legis.state.la.us/FieldsC/Topics/2006/letter.pdf
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V. OPPOSITION TO PRECLEARANCE

Over protest by civil rights groups,8 2 the DOJ approved the plan
for primary and general elections.8 3 A DOJ letter, in response to an
inquiry by Representative John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI) explained the reasoning behind preclearance. 84 The DOJ's main justification for approval appeared to revolve around the plan's supposed support by minority public officials. 85 In addition, while the DOJ noted that the
dismissal of a section 2 claim against the plan could not be used in its
determination, the case appears to have had some impact on the DOJ's
decision. 6 As will be shown, these two factors failed to adequately
explain why the DOJ felt compelled to approve a plan that clearly did
not protect a minority's right to vote.
A. Minority Support
According to the DOJ, the proposed plan "enjoyed the endorsement of the Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus."87 The emphasis on
approval from minority state and federal officials derives from Georgia v. Ashcroft.88 In Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court ruled on
whether a redistricting plan was properly precleared under section 5 of
the VRA. 89 The Court articulated a totality of the circumstances standard to determine whether retrogression occurred. 90 A key, but not
determinative, factor was Congressman John Lewis' (D-GA) support
of the proposed redistricting plan. 91 The Court stated that the Congressman's testimony could not easily be dismissed, and his support

82. See Clark-Flory, supranote 30.
83. Letter from William E. Moschella, Ass't Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to John Conyers, Jr., Congressman, U.S. House of Reps. (Mar. 16, 2006), at 2,
availableat http://electionlawblog.org/archives/new.orleans.conyers.letter.pdf'
84. Id.at 1-2.

85.

Id. at 1.

86.
87.

See id.at 2-3.
Id.at 1.

88.
89.
90.
91.

Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
Id. at 465.
Id. at 480-81.
Id. at 472, 484.
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was among many factors used in the totality of the circumstances
standard.92
With regard to the Louisiana election plan, the DOJ stated emphatically that "[m]inority members of the Louisiana House and Senate were unanimous in casting their votes for the election procedures."93 The support, however, was far from unanimous. Cleo
Fields, an African-American Louisiana State Senator, responded to the
DOJ with a letter to Representative Conyers stating that the claim of
their support was "simply not true." 94 He stated that both he "along
95
with other members of the [Black] Caucus objected to [the] plan."
Moreover, on March 7, 2006, Senator Fields sent a similar letter to
John Tanner of the DOJ's Civil Rights Division expressing his opposition.

96

The DOJ's reliance on minority support of an election plan encounters two major obstacles. First, the theory assumes that all minorities agree on the right course of action and thus does not acknowledge the diversity within minority groups. Second, the DOJ has a
history of using minority support as a justification for preclearance
only when it suits the agency's overall objectives. For example,
Georgia, a covered jurisdiction under section 5,97 passed a voter identification law that required voters to produce a driver's license, or
similar picture identification, in order to vote. 98 African-American
legislators in Georgia overwhelmingly rejected the bill and vowed "to
fight any plan that [did] not repeal the law." 99 The lack of minority
support, however, did not dissuade the DOJ from preclearing the
change. Thus, if the DOJ chooses to rely on minority support of election plans, it should also rely on objections.100
92. Id. at 489-90.
93. Letter from William E. Moschella to John Conyers, Jr., supra note 83, at 1.
94. Letter from Cleo Fields, Senator, State of La., to John Conyers, Jr., Con2006),
available at
(Mar.
17,
House
of Reps.
U.S.
gressman,
http://senate.legis.state.la.us/FieldsC/Topics/2006/letter.pdf.
95. Id.
96. Letter from Cleo Fields to John K. Tanner, supra note 81.
97. 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 app. (2006).
98. See Errin Haines, Black Lawmakers Vow to Repeal Ga. Voter Law,

CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W. Va.), Dec. 30, 2005, at 5D.
99. Id.
100. See Election Law: Becker Responds to DOJ (Mar. 24, 2006),
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B. Plan Survived Section 2 Claim
The DOJ also noted a lawsuit brought in federal court regarding
the proposed election plan.' 0 ' Along with section 5, the VRA provides another avenue for citizens to object to.changes in voting procedures. Section 2 of the VRA applies to all states and bans the
0 2
abridgement or denial of the right to vote based on race or color.'
the plaintiffs, not the state,
Unlike section 5, section 2 requires0 that
3
bear the burden to prove a violation.'
New Orleans voters, represented by the NAACP Legal Defense
and Education Fund and other civil rights organizations, brought a
section 2 claim in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana.' 0 4 The groups were concerned that flaws in the election
plan would disenfranchise thousands of African Americans. 105 Judge
Ivan Lemelle, an African-American federal district court judge, dismissed the claim, thus allowing the election to proceed. 0 6 Judge Lemelle stated the election was important because0 7 "we have a burning
desire for wholeness, completeness, normalcy."'
The Supreme Court, however, has long held that the success or
failure of a section 2 claim should have no bearing on the DOJ's preclearance decision. In Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Court stated, "In Bossier ParishI, we specifically held that a violation of § 2 is not an independent reason to deny preclearance under § 5.'1°8 The Court
explained the differences between the two sections: "In contrast to §
5's retrogression standard, the 'essence' of a § 2 vote dilution claim is
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/005261.html, for more examples of the DOJ's
uneven use of minority support.
101. See Letter from William E. Moschella to John Conyers, Jr., supra note 83,
at 2.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000).
103. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973c (2000).
104. Letter from William E. Moschella to John Conyers, Jr., supra note 83, at
2.
105. Adam Nossitor, Judge Orders New Orleans To Proceed with Election,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2006, at A12.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 539 U.S. 461, 478 (2003) (citing Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520
U.S. 471, 477 (1997)).
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that 'a certain electoral law, practice, or structure ... cause[s] an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect
their preferred representatives." ' 10 9 While the DOJ acknowledged that
a section 2 claim had no bearing on its preclearance of New Orleans'
plan, 1 0 the mere mention of it brings into question whether the DOJ
actually evaluated the merits of the proposed election plan separate
and apart from Judge Lemelle's section 2 ruling.
The DOJ, however, failed to protect displaced voters when it
clearly had the means to do so. Minorities held a worse position than
they had in previous elections and not all steps were taken to ease the
burden on displaced residents' ability to vote.. The question must be
asked: If the DOJ failed to find a section 5 violation in this case, what
extreme circumstances would it take to find a violation?
VI. FUTURE NEW ORLEANS' ELECTIONS

Despite, or maybe because of, the obstacles displaced New Orleans residents faced, African Americans were able to have a voice in
the Spring 2006 elections. Mayor Ray Nagin received an estimated
90% of the African-American vote for the April primary"' and went
on to win the general election." 2 As expectied, overall turnout was
down to 36% from 46% in the 2002 mayoral race.'1 3 The percentage
of white voters participating in the primary election increased from
previous elections." 4 Yet, voter turnout was low for black neighborhoods that were hardest hit by Hurricane Katrina." 5 While "[i]t is not
unusual for white turnout to be higher [than black turnout],. . . in past
109. Id. (quoting Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986)).

110. Letter from William E. Moschella to John Conyers, Jr., supra note 83, at
3.
111. Kim Cobb & Kristen Mack, New OrleansMayoral Election: Black Voters
Made Their PresenceFelt: Predictions of Large Racial Shift in City Politics Prove
Unfounded,Hous. CHRON., Apr. 24, 2006, at Al.
112. Michelle Krupa & Matt Scallan, Broad Appeal Aided Nagin in Runoff..

Higher Turnout, White Support Gave Mayor the Edge Saturday, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans), May 22, 2006, National, at 1.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Anne Rochell Konigsmark, New Orleans' Upheaval Shows in Vote Results: Mayor 1st in Primary, but His Re-Election Is Hardly a Certainty, USA
TODAY, Apr. 24, 2006, at 7A.
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elections there typically was a 10-percentage-point difference between
6
white and black participation."''
Regardless of whether the "black candidate" won, Louisiana
needs to take steps to ensure greater voter participation in future elections. The voting procedures for the April and May elections have yet
to be extended to future elections. As a result, there remains a need to
alter existing Louisiana election laws. New Orleans is expected to
have recovered only around half of its pre-Katrina population by
2008.117 Houses remain uninhabitable and plans continue to be
drafted on how best to rebuild the city's infrastructure. If another hurricane were to hit New Orleans, the city's recovery could be even further extended. Therefore, to ensure equal access to the ballot, this essay proposes three key provisions that the legislature should adopt for
elections through the 2008 presidential election. First, New Orleans
should institute a same-day registration policy. Second, out-of-state
satellite voting sites must be placed in states with large populations of
displaced voters. Lastly, the legislature must further loosen absentee
ballot guidelines. Without these, or similar provisions, the DOJ
should deny preclearance. These provisions will allow displaced voters, who do not register to vote in another state, to have a voice in
their city's rebuilding.
(1) Same-Day Registration
Louisiana should suspend the thirty-day registration requirement
and implement same-day registration. Unfortunately, this will not
help those who register by mail and vote absentee. However, it will
allow those either in New Orleans or at the proposed satellite polling
stations a greater opportunity to vote. Some states already allow citizens to register on election day at the polls. For example, Wisconsin
permits voters to complete a registration form at the polling location. 118 If the citizen provides proper identification, she is given a
regular ballot that will be tabulated with those who pre-registered." 9
Same-day registration is ideal for voters at satellite locations in that
they would be able to vote even if they did not receive prior registration information.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See Wis. STAT. § 6.29(2) (2004).
Id.
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(2) Allow Access to Absentee Ballotsfor First-Time Voters
All restrictions for first-time voters should be eliminated, thus allowing them to vote by absentee ballot. If the state chooses not to allow out-of-state satellite voting sites, the burden on first-time voters
will continue. All voters should be allowed to cast an absentee ballot
if they register by mail, provide the proper identification, and complete the voter affidavit.
The federal government also has the opportunity to ensure voter
participation in future congressional elections. If Louisiana fails to
ease the absentee ballot burdens, the federal government should pass
U.S. Senator Russell D. Feingold's (D-WI) Displaced Citizens Voter
Protection Act of 2005.120 The Act seeks to extend to displaced Hurricane Katrina evacuees the registration and voting procedures currently available to military and overseas voters. 121 Senator Feingold
stated that:
[w]e must make sure that those who intend to return are given the
opportunity to elect the federal leaders who will shape the recovery
process. This is a common-sense measure that can assure those
who have lost so much their right to22participate in elections that will
have a direct impact on their lives.1
The Feingold bill would apply to all federal elections held during
2006 through 2008.123 It requires state voter registration authorities to
1 24
inform voters of their expanded rights under the law.
120. S. 1867, 109th Cong. (2005).
121. Id. The bill is the Senate companion to H.R. 3734 introduced by U.S.
Representative Artur Davis (D-AL). See H.R. 3734, 109th Cong. (2005). The Senate version currently has only two cosponsors, Mary Landrieu (D-LA) and John
THOMAS, Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgiKerry (D-MA).
binlbdquery/z?d109:SN01867:@@@P (last visited Oct. 9, 2006). The House verTHOMAS, Library of Congress,
sion is supported by forty cosponsors.
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 09:HR03734:@@@P (last visited Oct. 9,
2006).
122. Press Release, U.S. Senator Russ Feingold, Feingold Bill Helps Ensure
That Displaced Hurricane Katrina Survivors Can Vote in Their Home States: Util-

izes Absentee Procedures Currently Available for Military and Overseas Voters
12, 2005), available at
(Oct.
05/10/20051012.html.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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The Uniformed & Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act
(UOCAV) 12 5 specifically requires every state to allow soldiers and
126
overseas citizens to cast an absentee ballot in federal elections.
Like the Louisiana law for overseas voters,127 there is no intent of
residence requirement. 12 8 Most importantly, UOCAV does not require
newly registered electors to have previously voted in person at their
home precinct. 129 Therefore, any displaced voter, regardless of
whether they had previously registered or voted in a New Orleans
election, would be afforded the right to vote.
Either Louisiana or the federal government must ease the restrictions currently placed on absentee ballots. Allowing all voters, regardless of how they previously voted, the opportunity to cast an absentee ballot would increase voter participation.
(3) Out-of-State Satellite Polling Sites
Louisiana must allow out-of-state satellite polling sites in states
that have a significant population of displaced New Orleans residents.
It is hard to understand why the state chose not to have such sites in
the first place. Some point to the ability of Iraqi citizens living in the
United States to cast ballots in this country for an election half a world
away as a basis for allowing out-of-state polling sites for these elections.' 30 Moreover, Louisiana must prepare itself for the possibility
that another hurricane could strike New Orleans, thus causing more
destruction and lessening the likelihood that people can move back to
the city. By providing satellite polling sites, along with less restrictive
absentee ballot provisions, all voters will have easier access to participation in future elections.
VII. CONCLUSION
The complex challenges surrounding New Orleans' elections are
most likely not high on many survivors' list of worries. The loss of
life and home is far more devastating than the ability to vote. Yet, in

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

42 U.S.C. § 1973ff (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-1.
See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18:101(E)(2) (2004).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff.
See id.

130. See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 24.
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order for New Orleans to rise from the flood waters, it will need to reestablish the most basic of government services, including elections.
Now more than ever, it is important for all New Orleans citizens to
have a say in who will lead their city. To protect the right to vote,
Louisiana must liberalize its election code to better allow displaced
voters an opportunity to participate in elections. Only with these provisions will displaced residents be able to have a voice in how their
city is rebuilt.
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